Anthony Caiby v. Tammy Ferguson by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-24-2019 
Anthony Caiby v. Tammy Ferguson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Anthony Caiby v. Tammy Ferguson" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 1027. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/1027 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
ALD-023        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2414 
___________ 
 
ANTHONY V. CAIBY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TAMMY FERGUSON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-00423) 
District Judge:  Honorable Wendy Beetlestone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 24, 2019 
Before:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 24, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Appellant Anthony Caiby, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), 
appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil action filed under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 as factually frivolous and for failure to state a claim.  Because the appeal presents 
no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
Caiby, a Pennsylvania prisoner, sought to file an IFP complaint against 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Superintendent Tammy Ferguson and unidentified 
DOC employee-defendants for alleged civil rights violations.  The District Court 
permitted Caiby to proceed IFP but dismissed his complaint with leave to amend.  In his 
amended complaint, Caiby alleged that he was the victim of a clandestine program to 
inflict mental and physical torture called the “Mind Initiative,” implemented by 
unconstitutional DOC policies and customs.  See Am. Comp., ECF No. 16 at 12 (¶ 6) and 
14 (¶ 15).  Caiby described being “slashed continuously,” id. at 4 (§ IV(B)), “cut to the 
‘burn censors’ third cuticle down,” id., “lasered down to the cellular wall,” id. at 12 (¶ 4), 
and implanted with “renal/neural impulse control,” id. at 15 (¶ 24).  Caiby claimed that 
DOC officials abducted him and otherwise retaliated against him for divulging the details 
of the alleged program.  See id. at 15 (¶ 22) and 24 (¶ 83).  Additionally, Caiby asserted 
that he was assaulted numerous times by multiple cellmates.  Id. at 13 (¶ 10). 
The District Court screened Caiby’s amended complaint and dismissed it with 
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).  In particular, the Court found 
that many of Caiby’s claims were factually frivolous because they were not based in 
reality.  The District Court further ruled that Caiby otherwise failed to state a § 1983 
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claim because he did not adequately allege that the defendants were personally involved 
in the purported wrongdoing.  Caiby timely appealed.1 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal of Caiby’s amended complaint.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  We construe his pro se complaint liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 
520 (1972), and may affirm the District Court’s order if the appeal does not present a 
substantial question.   See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
We agree with the District Court that most of Caiby’s claims appear to be 
“irrational” or “wholly incredible” statements, and thus are frivolous within the meaning 
of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).  A claim is 
considered factually frivolous where “the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ . . . a 
category encompassing allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ . . . ‘fantastic,’ . . . and 
‘delusional.’”  Id. at 32-33 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)).  
For example, Caiby’s complaint includes numerous references to concepts like telepathic 
commands and mind control. 
To the extent Caiby’s allegations about having been cut by his cellmates can be 
understood to assert a claim that the defendants failed to protect him from being assaulted 
by other inmates, he failed to state a claim.  See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d 
                                              
1 Caiby has filed a motion for appointment of counsel, as well as documents in which he 
complains that he has been retaliated against for litigating the claims underlying this case. 
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Cir. 2012) (holding that a plaintiff must show that (1) he was “incarcerated under 
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”; (2) prison officials acted with 
“deliberate indifference” to his safety; and (3) the prison officials’ “deliberate 
indifference caused him harm”). 
We likewise agree with the District Court that Caiby failed to state that the 
defendants were personally responsible for the alleged constitutional violations against 
him, which is required to maintain a successful civil rights action under § 1983.  See 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3rd Cir. 1988).  For instance, Caiby did not 
specify what Superintendent Ferguson did or did not do to give rise to a claim against 
her; he named her as a defendant because “she has the power as the head administrative 
[sic] to grant discovery.”  Am. Comp., ECF No. 16 at 14 (¶ 15).  While Caiby’s 
complaint referenced a DOC policy that “promulgated and enforced” the alleged civil 
rights violations against him, he failed to actually identify the policy or connect it to 
Ferguson’s actions.  Id. at 6 (§ VII(C)).  Nor did Caiby make any more specific 
allegations regarding any Jane or John Doe defendants. 
Finally, given that Caiby was granted leave to amend his initial complaint, and 
that he failed to correct any of the complaint’s deficiencies in his amended complaint, the 
District Court did not err when it declined to grant Caiby further leave to amend.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that leave 
to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile). 
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As this appeal presents no substantial question, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order of dismissal.  See 3d LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Caiby’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).  Also, to the 
extent that he presents any requests for relief in the other documents he filed, those 
requests are denied. 
 
